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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION OF
FOREIGN BUSINESS UNDER THE U.S.
SECURITIES LAWS
ROBERT
RONALD

C. HACKERt
D. ROTUNDAt

The UnitedStates securitieslaws, if appliedexpansively, can have a
great impact on securities transactionsboth in the United States and
abroad In this Article, the authorsexamine the extraterritorialapplication of the U.S. securities law. Most of the judicial activity in this
areahas been concernedwith the applicationof the antifraudprovisions
of the securitieslaws to the regulation of the affairs offoreign individuals and businesses. In order to combatfraudulentforeign securities
transactionsthe courts have developed very broadtestsforsubject matterjurisdiction. After introducingbasicprincples of internationallaw,
the authors analyze this extraterritorialapplicationof the 1934 Act ant/fraudprovisions. They then examine the application of otherprovisions of the securities laws to foreign transactionsand argue that the
broadtests developed under the antfraudprovisions should not be extendedto these other areasofsecuritiesregulation. The authorscaution
against broadly imposing US. regulatoryprovisions upon the internal
operationsof aforein business already subject to the regulatory authority of its domiciliary country.
I.

INTRODUCTION

With increasing frequency foreigners are becoming concerned with the

extraterritorial application of the United States securities laws.' The American case law on this subject is focused on the application of the antifraud
provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act"). 2 In these cases the courts have developed two tests for subject matter
t Member, District of Columbia and Illinois Bars. A.B. 1962 and J.D. 1965, University of
Illinois.
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B. 1967 and J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
The authors would like to dedicate this Article to J. Nelson Young, who recently became
Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois and who is now Professor of Law at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Professor Young taught law to Mr. Hacker when the latter was
a student at Illinois. Professor Young also has been a colleague there with Professor Rotunda,
with whom he coauthored CONSTITTIONAL LAW, one of the West hornbook series.
The authors would like to thank Dean Peter Hay and Professor Francis Boyle of the University of Illinois for reading the manuscript and offering many helpful suggestions, and Clarence
Krantz and Steven Stevens for their research assistance.
I. See, e.g., B. RIDER & H. FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 426 (1979),
reviewed in Painter, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 664 (1980); Loss, Extraterritorialityin the
FederalSecurities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305 (1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The provision states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
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jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign persons. The first test is based on conduct within the United States; the second is based on effects within the United
States of conduct occurring principally abroad. While some of the cases have
involved aspects of both the conduct test and the effects test, the line of cases
makes it clear that a court may, under proper circumstances, support subject
matter jurisdiction based either on a pure conduct test or on a pure effects test.
In this Article we analyze the line of cases arising under section 10(b), and
conclude that the two alternative tests developed by the courts reflect the likely
intent of Congress with respect to the extra-territorial application of the federal securities laws to isolated transactions, such as fraudulent misrepresentations, that have some contact with the United States. On the other hand, we
argue that the broad tests for extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions should not apply equally to other provisions of the federal securities
laws, such as the proxy rules3 or the short-swing trading provisions of section
16(b).4 Such a course of action would result in American securities laws regulating the ongoing, internal affairs of a foreign business.
In making this argument we first consider the extraterritorial application
of the broker-dealer regulations to a foreign broker-dealer. Section 30(b) of
the 1934 Act5 exempts from regulation under that Act any broker-dealer that
conducts its business outside the jurisdiction of the United States. In section
30(b) Congress appears to have drawn a distinction between regulations that
would apply to the ongoing business affairs of a foreign broker-dealer, and
provisions such as section 10(b) that apply to isolated transactions that might
have an impact on the United States. In contrast to jurisdiction under section
10(b), jurisdiction under the 1934 Act over a foreign broker-dealer is based on
a test that requires both essential acts within the United States and foreseeable
effects from the conduct in question on protected United States interests.
We next turn to the extraterritorial application of section 16(b) to the insiders of a foreign corporation. Although the section 30(b) exemption would
not be available for most foreign corporations that have a class of securities
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act, 6 the policy underlying section
30(b) should be equally applicable to the extraterritorial application of broad
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
3. Id. § 78n; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1980).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
5. Id. § 78dd(b). This section provides that:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention ofsuch rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent
the evasion of this chapter.

6. Id. § 78.
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regulatoryprovisions such as section 16(b). Congress should be found to have

intended to extend subject matter jurisdiction under the 1934 Act to regulate
the ongoing, internal affairs of a foreign company only when the activities in

question involve essential acts within the United States and have a foreseeable
effect on United States persons or on the United States securities markets.

Thus, even when conduct within the United States, standing alone, may be
sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a foreign company or its of-

ficers, directors, and principal stockholders, subject matter jurisdiction under
the 1934 Act to regulate the ongoing, internal affairs of such a foreign company should require, apart from conduct, a foreseeable impact on protected
United States interests.
II.
A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
DOMESTIC LAW

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Customary international law recognizes that domestic law has extraterri-

torial application only in limited circumstances. While it is difficult to summarize all of the intricacies involved, one should be aware of some of the basic
principles governing a state's assertion of its jurisdiction in civil and criminal
cases.

International law generally recognizes the territorial principle that a state
has subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases over anything located in its territory or over the conduct of any person, including an alien, that occurs within
the state's territory. 7 In addition, conduct abroad that produces requisite effects within the state is also considered within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the state. The extraterritorial conduct and the effect must be constituent ele-

ments of the activity prescribed, and the effect of the activity must be both
substantial and a direct and foreseeable or intended result of the conduct. s It
7. Eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as REST. FOR. REL.]. Section 17 provides that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside
the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
For the various recognized definitions of "territory," see id. §§ 11-16.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945); The King
v. Oliphant, [1905] 2 K.B. 67; REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 18, which provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent
with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
For a discussion of the question of intent, see Akehurst, Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw,46 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 155 (1975). See generally Rosenthal & Flowe,-4 New Approach to U.S. Enforce-
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is generally accepted that jurisdiction based upon the effects of activities
abroad includes within its provisions laws aimed at preventing conduct abroad
that would have internal effects.
International law also recognizes a state's jurisdiction over the conduct of
its nationals, wherever it may occur. 9 Assuming a genuine link between the
national subject and the state, an individual is considered to have the nationality of the state that confers it upon him, 10 while a private legal entity has the
nationality of the state in which it is created. I The United States usually does
not rely upon this nationality principle to establish jurisdiction, although several exceptions have been made in tax,12 trademark infringement, and antitrust cases. 13 It is generally recognized that, unless otherwise indicated,
United States statutory law applies only to conduct that occurs within the
country or that produces the requisite effect within the country. 14
The most widely recognized principles of international jurisdiction over
criminal activities are based upon internal conduct or effects that are constituent elements of the prescribed offense. These territorial bases of criminal jumaent ofAntitrust Laws.Against Foreign Cartels,6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 81 (1980); Oliver,
Extraterritorial
Application of UnitedStates Legislation againstRestrictiPe or Unfair Trade Practices, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 380 (1957).
9. REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 30:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wherever the

conduct occurs or
(b) as to the status of a national or as to an interest of a national, wherever the
thing or other subject-matter to which the interest relates is located.
(2) A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct
affects one of its nationals.
10. Id. § 26 provides that "[aln individual has the nationality of a state that confers it upon
him provided there exists a genuine link between the state and the individual." See Nottebohm
Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4 (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala).
11. "A corporation or other private legal entity has the nationality of the state which creates
it." REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 27. Seenote 86 infra.
12. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 129, Reporter's Note (1971).
13. Compare Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), with Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) and Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633
(2d Cir. 1956). See generally K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(1958); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973); Note, ExtraterritorialApplicationof the Antitrust Laws, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1956).
14. REST. FOR REL., supra note 7, § 38. An example of a statute clearly indicating extraterritorial application is 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976) (subpoena of person in foreign country).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra

note 7, asserts that a state may not extend its jurisdiction to "prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to the conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct
affects one of its nationals." Id. § 30(2) & Illustration 5. Not all nations recognize this limitation.
France goes far beyond § 30 in article 14 of the French Civil Code, providing that it has jurisdiction over aliens domiciled within France or abroad who have incurred civil liability to a French
national, regardless of his location. Article 14 does not require that the cause of action be connected with France. This assertion ofjurisdiction has been highly criticized, but the French justify
it upon a claim of the necessity of providing the high quality of Frenchjustice to national subjects,
and upon the lack of a French provision establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction. Furthermore,

article 15 authorizes French jurisdiction over a French national for obligations contracted by him
in a foreign country, whether or not the other party is French. See generally H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 751-52 (2d ed. 1976).
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risdiction closely parallel the territorial bases of civil jurisdiction. Some
countries, however, have expanded the accepted rule and claim jurisdiction
over activities that produce internal effects that are not a constituent element

of the crime involved.15

The nationality principle establishes criminal jurisdiction of a state over

acts of its nationals abroad. International law does not require that the act be
criminal under the lex loei. 16 As with civil jurisdiction based upon nationality,
the United States and other common-law nations have been reluctant to exercise such extraterritorial powers. Instead, these countries tend to extend the
territorial concept of criminal jurisdiction to achieve the desired result.

International law also recognizes a protective principle, allowing a state to
exercise jurisdiction over any conduct occurring outside of its territory that
threatens its security, such as counterfeiting of the state's currency.17 Furthermore, under the universality principle any state-because of the common in18
terest in all states-has jurisdiction to try certain crimes, such as piracy.
Related to the universality principle is the passive personality principle, stating
that jurisdiction exists over aliens for criminal acts committed against nation-

als abroad. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law expressly rejects this
20
principle, 19 as do many states.

15. Akehurst, supra note 8, at 153. See generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 14, at
854-931.
16. Akehurst, supra note 8, at 156. Some states, however, including France and Turkey,
require that the act be criminal under the lex loci, that the crimes be serious, or that prosecution
be requested by either the injured party or his government. Id See generally M. WESER, CONVENTION COMMUNAUTAIRE SUR LA COMPETENCE JUDICIARE ET L'EXECUTION DES DECISIONS 99111 (1975); Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10 AM. J.

COMP. L. (1961).
17. REST. FOR REL., supra note 7, § 33:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its
governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under
the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
(2) Conduct referred to in Subsection (1) includes in particular the counterfeiting of the
state's seals and currency, and the falsification of its official documents.
Common-law countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom usually do not exercise
such jurisdiction. Thus, within the United States it is a crime to counterfeit foreign currency, 18
U.S.C. § 482 (1976), but no American law forbids counterfeiting U.S. currency abroad. REST.
FOR. REL., supra note 7, at 93.
18. REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 34. See also id., Reporter's Note, at 97:
In addition to the slave trade, traffic in women for prostitution, traffic in narcotic drugs,
and war crimes have been the subject of similar universal condemnation. However, with
the possible exception of war crimes ... universal interest in the suppression of slavery
and these other crimes has not as yet been carried to the point of recognizing, either in
customary law or in international agreements, the principle of universal jurisdiction that
obtains in the instance of piracy.
19. Id., Comment, at 88. See id. § 30(2), quoted in notes 8 & 9 supra.
20. But cf. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (a state is free to exercise jurisdiction as long as there is not an established norm of international law to the contrary).
Nations that subscribe to this theory could present an argument that it would apply to fraud
of the type delineated in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The act of fraud requires
misrepresentation with the intent to deceive. To this extent, scienter becomes a necessary element
of the crime, and the parallel to criminal law is obvious. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921
(2d Cir. 1980).
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As is readily seen, the United States in many instances does not exercise
its jurisdictional power to the fullest extent allowed by customary international law. The general rule in the United States is that subject matter jurisdiction can be asserted over the extraterritorial activities of a foreign person
when (1) conduct has occurred within the United States, 2 1 or (2) conduct has
a substantial and foreseeable or intended effect
occurred abroad that caused
22
within the United Stats.
Although the United States has the power to apply its laws to the extraterritorial activities of foreign persons under either of these principles, the first
question before a United States court with respect to any particular statute is
whether Congress in fact intended the provisions of the statute to be applied to
the activities of foreign persons to the fullest extent allowed by international
law. 23 The courts in the United States have considered the extraterritorial ap25
plication of the 1934 Act 24 primarily in actions arising under section 10(b)
26
and rule lOb-5 of that Act, which prohibit any person from using the means
and instrumentalities of United States interstate commerce to effect fraudulent
transactions in securities. The courts generally have held that Congress intended the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act to apply extraterritorially only
when there has been some conduct occurring within the United States or some
significant impact on United States investors or on the United States securities
markets. 27 A mere incidental use of the means and instrumentalities of
21. See REST. FOR. REL., supra note 7, § 17.
22. See id. §§ 18, 38. See also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 281, 285 (1911). The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 generally supersedes these rules ofjurisdiction for forein states
and their agents or instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976). See New
England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Iranian assets litigation). See generally Delaume, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunites Act, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 640 (1980).
If the relevant acts of foreigners take place outside of the territory of the United States, mere
effects in the United States are insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The effects must be "substantial"
and either be intended or "occur 'as a direct and foreseeable result' of that particular conduct."
Id. at 646. See also Akehurst, supra note 8, at 155.
23. See United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1980).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
25. Id. § 78j(b).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
27. But see Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980); East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383
(S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aj'd, 592 F.2d
1979).
673 (2d Cir.
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United States commerce, however, will not support subject matter jurisdiction
over an allegedly fraudulent extraterritorial transaction.
1. Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the 1934 Act
Although subject matter jurisdiction in section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions depends on congressional intent, there is, unfortunately, little in the 1934
Act to guide the courts. Consequently, the courts have developed two basic
tests to determine whether jurisdiction exists. If a transaction satisfies either
an "effects" test or a "conduct" test, subject matter jurisdiction will be found.
This section will trace the development and application of these tests as they
have been applied to rule lOb-5 actions.
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook2U plaintiffs alleged that an issue of stock in
Canada to insiders of a Canadian company at an unfairly low price adversely
affected the value and the price of the company's shares listed on the American Stock Exchange, some of which were held by resident U.S. citizens including the plaintiff. In holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over
the violations alleged to have taken place outside the United States, the Second Circuit defined the extraterritorial reach of the 1934 Act: "We believe
that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in
order to protect domestic investors who have purchasedforeign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securitiesmarketfrom the ef'29
fects of improperforeign transactionsin American securities."

While the Schoenbaum court found jurisdiction over an extraterritorial
transaction in foreign securities because it affected the domestic securities market, several years later the same circuit in Investment PropertiesInternational,
Ltd v. lOS, Ltd.30 rephrased the test:

[A]lthough the behavior of a defendant, including its connection to
the United States and to the domestic securities market and exchanges, is relevant in deciding whether an extraterritorial transaction comes within the jurisdiction of the Act, the main consideration
[1] on
appears to be: does the transactionhave some signtflcant impact
31
the domestic securities market or /2] on domestic investors[?]
In Leasco DataProcessingEqupment Corp. v. Maxwell 32 the Second Cir-

cuit developed a test applicable to an extraterritorial transaction in foreign
securities traded exclusively in foreign markets. In Leasco a series of alleged
misrepresentations about an English corporation were made in the United
States to officers of a publicly held U.S. corporation that was being induced to
purchase the British corporation's stock. Even though other misrepresenta28. 405 F.2d 200, modAed on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en band), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See generally Becker, Extraterritorial Dimensions ofthe Securities
ExchangeAct, 2 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 233 (1969).
29. 405 F.2d at 206 (emphasis added).
30. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,011 (S.D.N.Y.), af'dmer.,
No. 71-1415 (2d Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 90,735 (emphasis added).
32. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
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tions were made in England and the purchase of the shares was effected there,
the court concluded that "if Congress had thought about the point, it would
...have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the
United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities
abroad. ....
The Leasco court noted that "[w]hen no fraud has been practiced in this
country and the purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be hard
pressed to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum.34 On the facts in
Leasco, however, the issue did not arise. Because Leasco involved both significant conduct within the United States (misrepresentations in U.S. territory)
and a direct impact on U.S. investors, the court was not required to decide
whether one or both facts--conduct and effects-would be enough to support
subject matter jurisdiction.
In Bersch v. DrexelFirestone,Inc.35 the Second Circuit clarified the extent
to which significant domestic conduct is a necessary element for jurisdiction
when there is a direct impact on U.S. investors. Bersch was a class action
brought on behalf of persons who had purchased common stock in Investors
Overseas Services ("IOS"), a Canadian corporation, in a public offering
abroad pursuant to an allegedly misleading prospectus. The plaintiff class included U.S. citizens who were resident both in the United States and abroad
and foreigners resident abroad. The plaintiffs alleged that IOS,with the assistance of U.S. accountants and underwriters, planned the offering and partially
drafted the prospectus within the United States.
The court concluded that the activities that occurred in the United States
would not of themselves confer subject matter jurisdiction for the foreign
plaintiffs because the activities were "merely preparatory" to the actual fraud,
which was committed by placing the allegedly false prospectus in the purchaser's hands. 36 The court found, however, that the dispatch of misleading
statements from abroad to residents in the United States to induce them to
purchase foreign securities abroad would support jurisdiction for these residents. With respect to the U.S. citizens resident abroad, the court concluded
that "[w]hile merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough
to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located
'37
abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident.
Thus, in Bersch the court formulated the most comprehensive test to date
.33

33.
34.
35.
36.
adverse

Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1334.
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
Id. at 992. The court rejected plaintifis argument that jurisdiction could be based on the
economic impact of the collapse of lOS on the domestic securities markets and on domes-

tic investors, stating:
[Tihere is subject matter jurisdiction of fraudulent acts relating to securities which are
committed abroad only when these result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse
effect on the American economy or American investors generally.
Id. at 989 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 992.

19811

EXTRA TERRITORIAL REGULATION

of the application of the antifraiid provisions of the 1934 Act to extraterritorial
transactions in foreign securities:
We have thus concluded that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to
act) of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resiacts (or culpable failures to act) of matedent abroad if,
but only if,
rial importance in the United States have significantly contributed
thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable 38failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses.
In a companion case, liT v. Vencap, Ltd.,39 decided the same day as
Bersch, the Second Circuit determined, at least with respect to a U.S. defendant, that perpetration of the fraudulent acts themselves within the United
States would confer jurisdiction. The court stated that it did not believe that
"Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled
only to foreigners."'' The court further emphasized, however, that jurisdiction could not be based on mere preparatory activities within the United
States.
The Second Circuit, in essence, has developed criteria for finding subject
matter jurisdiction based on either conduct or effect in the United States, although it did not explicitly use those labels. Under the jurisdictional test in
Bersch, a foreigner could be subject to jurisdiction under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 if any of the investment information or materials regarding foreign
securities that it transmits to U.S. citizens resident in the United States are
materially misleading even though such Americans may purchase or sell the
securities abroad relying on the information or materials. Similarly, in Des
Brisay v. Goldield Corp.41 the Ninth Circuit found jurisdiction over acts that
were substantially foreign in origin when they resulted in a direct adverse effect on domestic securities markets. An adverse effect on U.S. securities markets apparently will support jurisdiction regardless of whether the securities in
question were those of a U.S. citizen or a foreign issuer.42
A foreigner, however, would not be subject to jurisdiction under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 for merely transmitting allegedly misleading advisory
38. Id. at 993.
39. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 1017. See also SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977), in which the court permitted the SEC to sue to enjoin allegedly fraudulent actions commited in the United States by a U.S. and a Canadian corporation against another Canadian corporation, even though the foreign corporation was the sole victim of the fraud and there were no
noticeable effects of the fraud in the United States.
41. 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
42. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (8th Cir. 1972).
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information or materials regarding foreign securities to U.S. citizens resident
abroad or to foreigners as no acts of material importance by such foreigner
occurring in the United States would have significantly contributed to any in-

jury of such persons. 43 If the advisory materials were prepared in the United

States, though, that would be sufficient to give the court subject matter jurisdiction to the extent that the materials were sent to U.S. citizens resident

abroad.44 The simple act of preparing the materials in the United States, however, seemingly would not support jurisdiction over foreigners who delivered

the materials abroad to other foreigners, the preparation of such materials beig "merely preparatory" to the actual fraud, which occurred when the materials were delivered abroad.

The line of cases from Schoenbaum to Bersch thus indicates two primary
concerns when a court is asked to give the federal securities laws extraterritorial effect. The first, articulated by Schoenbaum, is that the fraud must have
some "effect" in the United States.4 5 The second concern focuses on the

fraudulent actions themselves. For foreign sales to U.S. citizens resident
abroad or foreigners resident abroad, the Bersch test asks whether acts of material importance occurring in the United States contributed to, or directly
46
caused, the alleged losses.

ContinentalGrain (Australia)Ply. Ltd v. PaciFc Oilseeds, Inc. 4 7 explicitly
recognized that subject matter jurisdiction can be based purely on a conduct
test.48

In Continental Grain, an Australian corporation,

Continental,

purchased stock in another Australian corporation, Pacific Seeds, Ltd., from
three vendors. The vendors were a third Australian corporation, a California
corporation, and a California resident. The vendors did not inform the purchaser that a third-party supplier intended to reclaim valuable seedstock it had
sold to Pacific Seeds if the corporation were sold. The vendors used the mails

and telephone system in the United States to discuss the proposed purchase of
the corporation and the problems concerning the seedstock, and decided not to
43. One's potential exposure to an action by a U.S. resident for damages under rule lOb-5 has
been reduced significantly by the recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's alleged negligence
was insufficient to maintain a cause of action because rule lOb-5 required some showing of"scienter"--that is, intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. But see Hacker & Rotunda, The Reliance
on CounselDefense in Securities Cases: DamageActions v. IninctiveActions, 1 CORP. L. REV. 159
(1978).
Apart from the federal antifraud provisions, however, a negligent transmittal of allegedly
misleading advisory material to a U.S. resident by a foreigner or its agents might give rise to an
action in tort under state common law. See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTivE 36-39
(1976). Many states also have adopted statutory law governing securities transactions that might
be applicable to such foreigners if they or their agents transmitted allegedly misleading advisory
material to persons within the state. As we discuss in the next section, a state court might be able
to exercise personal jurisdiction over such a foreigner pursuant to a state "long-arm" statute for an
alleged violation of state common law or statutory law.
44. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975).
45. 405 F.2d at 206. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
46. 519 F.2d at 993.
47. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 417.
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inform the purchaser of the supplier's intentions. The contract for sale was
executed in California but, apparently for tax reasons, was closed in Australia.
The court first noted that there was no measurable effect of the fraud in
the United States. The sole victim of the fraudulent nondisclosure was a foreign corporation, and the securities sold were not traded on any American
exchange. Therefore, the transaction had no measurable effect on the domestic securities market and had, at best, only a minimal effect in the United
States.

49

The Eighth Circuit, however, found the conduct occurring in the United
States sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction:
[W]e examine the relationship between defendants' conduct in the
United States and the alleged fraudulent scheme, specifically
whether defendants' conduct in the United States was significant
with respect to the alleged violation and whether it furthered the
fraudulent scheme. The conduct in the United States cannot be
"merely preparatory" and must be material, that is, "directly cause
50
the losses."
Applied to the defendants before the court, the Eighth Circuit found that letters and telephone calls were necesary to further the fraudulent scheme and
constituted organization and completion of the fraud. Facilities of U.S. commerce were used to transmit the vendor's representatives between Australia
and California. Furthermore, two of the vendors were a U.S. corporation and
a U.S. resident. 5 1 Even though the ultimate effect was in Australia, the court
held that the conduct in the United States was significant and constituted a
fraud completed in the United States.52 The court conceded that its finding of
subject matter jurisdiction was based on policy considerations.5 3 Congress explicitly provided that the federal securities laws should apply to foreign commerce to prevent the United States from becoming a base for fraudulent
securities schemes. 5 4 In addition, such jurisdiction may encourage enforcement of antifraud laws internationally as well as maintain a high standard of
conduct in securities transactions.55 These policy considerations militated in
favor of subject matter jurisdiction, even if the fraud had no effect in the
United States.
The policy of not permitting the United States to become a haven for
fraudulent securities transactions was also present in SEC v. Kasser,56 in
49. Id. at 415. Continental was owned by a U.S. corporation and, because of the accounting
system used, the loss from the transaction would be reflected on the U.S. corporation's financial
statements. The court specifically held that this effect was too remote and insubstantial to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Id. at 417.

50. Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
Id. The court held, however, that the nationality of the corporation and the individual
5 I.
had "no independent significance for jurisdictional purposes." Id. at 417.
52. Id. at 420.

53. Id. at 421.
54. Id See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976).
55. 592 F.2d at 421.
56. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
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which the Third Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction will exist if there
is conduct in the United States that directly causes the fraud. In Kasser the
sole victim of the fraud was a Canadian corporation. There was no measurable effect of the fraud in the United States. The court found, however, that
57
conduct occurred in the United States that directly caused the victim's losses.
"We are reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United
States to become a 'Barbary Coast,' as it were, harboring international securities pirates.' "58
These various jurisdictional principles were recently applied in lIT v.
Cornfeld.59 In Cornfeld the district court dismissed the complaint of the liquidators of a Luxembourg corporation against alleged U.S. and foreign defrauders and against U.S. accounting and brokerage firms that aided and abetted
the fraud by certifying false financial statements and underwriting securities
offerings with knowledge of the fraud. The court rejected the claim that subject matter jurisdiction existed just because a fraction of one percent of the
fund holders in the investment trust were Americans. 60 Nor would a vague
of the United States to attract foreign investment
claim of a damaged 6ability
1
support jurisdiction.
Turning to a "conduct" test the court determined that, although the investment trust purchased substantial amounts of U.S. securities, this was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. To uphold jurisdiction on this
ground would mean that a "foreign shareholder in any foreign corporation
could bring a derivative action in this country to challenge the conduct of the
foreign directors who effected the purchases."'62 The court further characterized the conduct of the U.S. accounting and underwriting firms, if true, as
merely preparatory to the primary deception practiced on the fundholders.
The essence of the complaint was that foreign directors of the investment trust
looted the corporation. "Since virtually all the fundholders were foreign nationals residing in foreign countries, the deception. . . must have occurred
outside of the United States."' 63 The court concluded that the application of
rule 10b-5 to the foreign directors would be a "totally unprecedented and un64
authorized expansion of the reach" of that rule.
The Second Circuit, however, disagreed. 65 Although it agreed with the
district court's conclusion that the transactions' effects within the United States
were insufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction, 66 the court, nevertheless, found the conduct within the United States a sufficient basis for jurisdic57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.
462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), modfled, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 223 n.33.
Id.
Id. at 225. See note 86 infra.
462 F. Supp. at 224 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 226.
IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 917. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
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tion. 67 The court disagreed with the district court's characterization of the
transactions. It found that several U.S. defendants were more intimately in68
volved in the perpetration of fraud than was determined by the district court.
The court also placed greater emphasis on the trust's purchase of U.S. securities. It noted that "the American nationality of the issuer [and] the consummation of the transaction in the United States" both "pointed strongly toward
applying the antifraud provisions of [the] securities laws."' 69 The transaction
was sufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction even though "the purchaser was a foreigner and the orders were transmitted from abroad." 70 The
court rejected the idea that "foreigners engaging in security purchases in the
71
United States are not entitled to the protection of. . .[U.S.] securities laws."
The court went on to find subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the
72
trust's purchases of debentures from a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company.
The court viewed the debentures in substance as U.S. securities rather than as
foreign securities. 73 The court distinguished Bersch on the ground that in this
case U.S. securities were involved, a majority of the offerings occurred in the
United States, U.S. underwriters were heavily involved, and much of the work
was done in the United States.74 Thus, the court concluded that
while many of the acts in the United States. . .were similar to those
in Bersch, the relativity is entirely different because of the lack here
of the foreign activity so dominant in Bersch . .

.

. Determination

whether American activities "directly" caused losses to foreigners deStates but also
pends not only on how much was done in the United
75
on how much (here how little) was done abroad.
Though a court may find subject matter jurisdiction under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 based either upon acts of fraud that occurred in the United
States or on a foreseeable effect in the United States of fraudulent conduct
abroad, these two tests do not confer unlimited subject matter jurisdiction on
the federal courts. The limits of subject matter jurisdiction are illustrated in
the recent case of FidenasA G v. CompagnieInternationalePourLInformatique
67. 619 F.2d at 917-18.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919-21.
Id. at 919.

74. Id. at 919-20.
75. Id. at 920-21 (footnote omitted). The defendants also argued that the assertion of subject
matter jurisdiction would "affront" Luxembourg. Id. at 921. The court disposed of this argument

by noting:
The problem of conflict between our laws and that of a foreign government is much less
when the issue is the enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the securities laws than
with such provisions as those requiring registration of persons or securities. The primary

interest of Luxembourg is in the righting of a wrong done to an entity created by it. If
our anti-fraud laws are stricter than Luxembourg's, that country will surely not be offended by their application. If they are weaker. . . the [plaintiffs] made their choice
Id. This same theme is stressed throughout this Article.
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CII HoneywellBull SA .76 Three foreign dealers in commercial paper brought
a section 10(b) action against other foreign corporations and individuals who
allegedly issued fraudulent promissory notes. All transactions and fraudulent
conduct occurred outside of the United States, and all the plaintiffs were foreign. Although some of the fraudulent notes were sold to Americans, the court
found that this would not support jurisdiction when those U.S. purchasers
were not parties to the suit. 77 The plaintiffs also charged that a United States
parent corporation of one of the foreign defendants knew of the cover-up
phase of the alleged fraud. The court, however, characterized this conduct,
even if true, as at most secondary or ancillary conduct.78 The court characterized the actions as "predominantly foreign" and therefore found no subject
matter jurisdiction. 79 Thus, Fidenas indicates the limits of a "conduct" test.
When all parties to an action are foreigners resident abroad, and there is no
measurable effect in the United States, a court must find conduct in the United
States that directly causes the l6sses before it can maintain subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Extraterritorial Application of Broker-Dealer Regulations
Under Section 30(b)
Apart from the jurisdictional principles developed by the courts for application to the antifraud provisions of section 10(b), Congress specifically addressed the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 1934 Act in section 30(b), which
provides:
The provisions of this Chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business
in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he
transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe80 as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
The SEC has not adopted any rules or regulations under section 30(b).
There are two basic conditions to the applicability of the section 30(b)
exemption: that the exempt person "transact a business in securities" and that
he do so "without the jurisdiction of the United States."
(a) Business In Securities
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Schoenbaurm v. Firstbrook8 l examined the applicability of section 30(b) and found that "while section 30(b) was intended to exempt persons conducting a business in securities
76. 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
77. The court declined to rule on whether jurisdiction could be maintained if a U.S. purchaser brought the action. Id. at 8 n.4.
78. Id. at 8 (citing opinion of the trial court).
79. Id. at 10.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976).
81. 405 F.2d 200, modfed on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
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through foreign securities markets from the provisions of the Act, it does not
preclude extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act to persons who en-

gage in isolated foreign transactions.

' 82

The court thus made it clear that a

person must conduct a literal "business in securities" in order to come within

the section 30(b) exemption. The court reasoned that Congress enacted section 30(b) to allow persons to conduct a business in securities outside the

United States "without complying with the burdensome reporting requirement
of the Act and without being subject to its regulatory provisions.

'8 3

The ex-

emption is not available for persons engaging in isolated transactions, as for
in violation
instance nonbrokers and nondealers who make misrepresentations
84
securities.
of
sale
or
purchase
the
inducing
in
10(b)
of section
The position taken by the court in Schoenbaum represents a reasonable
policy distinction designed to promote the principle of comity among nations.
Absent compelling circumstances, section 30(b) leaves the regulation of the
internal business operations of foreign securities businesses to the authorities

of the host countries, but reserves to the competence of U.S. courts adjudication of disputes over isolated events having some contact with the United

States.
The courts have interpreted the section 30(b) exemption to be "limited in

its application so as to exempt from the 1934 Act only brokers, dealers and
banks" when they transact business outside the United States. 85 Thus, the

exemption is not available to exempt from regulation under the 1934 Act the
internal business operations of other types of foreign businesses. As will be
discussed in the next section, however, the logic underlying the section 30(b)

exemption seems equally applicable to other types of foreign businesses. Principles of international comity suggest that the internal business operations of
foreign business in general, as distinct from isolated events that impact on the
United States, should be left to the regulatory authorities of the domiciliary

nation unless regulation under United86 States law is essential for the protection
of legitimate United States interests.

82. 405 F.2d at 207. See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 n.21 (8th Cir.

1973).
83. 405 F.2d at 207.
84. Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC must provide expressly for their extraterritorial effect if § 30(b) is
not to apply, and the purpose of such rules must be to prevent evasion of the Act. H.R. RaP. No.
792, 73 dCong., 2d Sess. 23 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934). The
Commission has not promulgated any rules under § 30(b).
85. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (interpreting the
phrase "business of securities").
86. See the decision of the International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light & Power
Co. [19701 I.C.J. 3. The issue before the court was whether Belgium could exercise a right of
diplomatic protection on behalf of shareholders of Belgian nationality in a corporation organized
under the laws of Canada and having its primary place of business in Spain. The court held that
Belgium did not have the capacity to assert a claim on behalf of Belgian shareholders of a Canadian corporation against the Spanish Government for alleged abuse of its bankruptcy jurisdiction
and powers. The court stressed that unless Belgium had another independent and valid ground
for jurisdiction, "the general rule of international law authorizes the national state of the company
alone to make a claim." Id. 1 88. The court also expressed reservations that "competing diplo-
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Without the Jurisdictionof the United States

The Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. United FinancialGroup, Inc.,8 7 held that
"jurisdiction" as employed in section 30(b) is not defined as "territorial limits," and apparently decided that it was intended to mean subject matter jurisdiction. 88 The courts that have construed section 30(b) generally have
followed the rule that a transaction will be deemed to have occurred within the
jurisdiction of the United States only if both some necessary and substantial
element of the transaction occurred within the United States and the transaction had a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or the domestic securities mar89
kets.

In Kook v. Crang,90 for example, a Canadian brokerage firm extended
credit to a United States resident in an amount allegedly in excess of that
permitted by section 7(c) of the 1934 Act. The court, however, held that the
transaction did not have sufficient contacts with the United States to defeat the
section 30(b) exemption:
All the essentials of these transactions occurred without the United
States. Stock of a Canadian corporation was purchased on the Toronto Exchange by a Canadian brokerage house. The orders were
placed and payment received in Canada. Credit was extended and
the stocks were held as collateral in Canada. Confirmation and all
margin calls emanated from Canada. Whatever choice of law theory
might be applied, these were Canadian transactions, and the use of
the mails and telephone within the United States does not change the
locale.9 1

Nor was the otherwise foreign transaction deprived of the exemption because
the defendant maintained an office in the United States: "Certainly, the mere
presence of defendant as a broker or dealer [registered under the 1934 Act]
would not, without more, make its foreign transactions subject to the Act. ' 92
In Roth v. Fund ofFunds,Ltd.,93 the defendant, a Canadian corporation
based in Switzerland, was held not to be entitled to the section 30(b) exemption for purchases and sales of securities of a U.S. corporation within six
months in violation of section 16(b). The Second Circuit noted that "the Fund
matic claims ... could create an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in international economic relations." Id. 96.
87. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 357-58. Accord, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,889, at 97,027 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Second Circuit panel, in affirming
in part and reversing in part, did not reach this issue. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S.
1018 (1975).

89. See text accompanying notes 90-94 infra.
90. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

91. Id. at 390. Similarly, in Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48
F.R.D. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court held that the commodity futures transactions in question

were within the § 30(b) exemption because they "were between foreigners, were made in France
or in Italy and were executed on the London Exchange." Id. at 386.
92. 182 F. Supp. at 391. See UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, [1976-1977] FED.SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

95,874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
93. 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
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bought and sold the securities in question on the New York Stock Exchange,
utilizing New York City stock brokers to execute its orders to buy and sell, and
made payment for the purchases through a New York bank." 94 Consequently,
the court found that, as the transaction occurred within the United States and
had a direct effect on the domestic securities markets, it could not come within
the exemptive language "insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States."
In contrast to the expanded test governing subject matter jurisdiction
under the antifraud provisions of section 10(b), which allows jurisdiction on
the basis of either pure effects or pure conduct, 95 the section 30(b) test of extraterritorial jurisdiction requires a finding of both necessary and substantial conduct within the United States and a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or
securities markets. 96 The congressional purpose underlying section 30(b), as
well as principles of international comity, argue against applying the expanded
test for jurisdiction developed under section 10(b) to impose regulation under
the 1934 Act upon the internal business operations of a foreign business that is
subject to the regulatory authority of its host nation. Thus, a foreign brokerdealer should be exempt under section 30(b) from registration under the 1934
Act and from the extensive regulation of its ongoing business operations entailed by such registration, unless it conducts a necessary and substantial part
of its business within the United States and its business has a foreseeable effect
on United States persons or on the United States securities markets.
To illustrate, consider a foreign broker-dealer whose business involves the
following contacts with the United States. Our hypothetical foreign brokerdealer maintains an arrangement with a registered U.S. broker-dealer for the
execution and clearance of transactions in U.S. securities on behalf of the foreign broker-dealer's customers who are foreign persons; the foreign brokerdealer maintains custodian accounts in U.S. banks in connection with the
transactions in U.S. securities; the foreign broker-dealer provides investment
advisory materials and recommendations regarding foreign securities to U.S.
broker-dealers; members of the foreign broker-dealer travel to the United
States to discuss the U.S. broker-dealer's investment in foreign securities as a
means of soliciting brokerage business; and the foreign broker-dealer mails
information regarding specific foreign securities to U.S. investors pursuant to
their unsolicited requests for the information.
Section 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act 97 requires that all investment bro94. Id. at 422. See Sinva, Inc. v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), discussedin note 91 supra. See also United States v. Weisscredit Banca Commercial E D'Investimenti, 325 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re 10S, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 178,637 (SEC Administrative Proceedings, March 14, 1972).
95. See text accompanying notes 14-55 supra.

96. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person other than a
natural person or a natural person not associated with a broker or dealer which is a
person other than a natural person (other than such a broker or dealer whose business is

exclusively intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of a national securities
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kers98 or dealers, 99 with certain exceptions not relevant here, who "make use
of the mails or of any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to
effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of,. . any security
otherwise than on a national securities exchange" must register with the SEC.
Unlike an attempt to effect or induce a transaction, a mere incidental use of
the means or instrumentalities of U.S. interstate commerce in connection with
a foreign broker-dealer's conduct of a wholly extraterritorial brokerage business would not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction under section
15(a)(1). 100 Given our hypothetical set of facts the question is whether the
foreign broker-dealer's additional contacts with the United States represent its
engagement in the "business" of a broker-dealer within the jurisdiction of the
United States so that the section 30(b) exemption is unavailable and the registration requirements of section 15(a)(1) are applicable. Under a jurisdictional
test that would require both essential conduct within the United States and a
foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or U.S. securities markets, none of the activities of this hypothetical foreign broker-dealer should result in a finding of
subject matter jurisdiction under section 15(a)(1).
(i) Providing Investment Advisory Materials and Advice to
U.S. Broker-Dealers
The solicitation of securities business has been viewed as an essential element of conducting business as a broker-dealer. 10 1 A foreign broker-dealer
that provides investment advisory materials and advice regarding foreign securities to American broker-dealers obviously does so as a means of soliciting
brokerage business in foreign securities. Thus, it might be argued that the
foreign broker-dealer's conduct of business within the United States, standing
alone, should be sufficient under a pure conduct test to assert subject matter
jurisdiction and require registration under section 15(a)(1).
This conclusion may well be the wrong result because the foreign brokerdealer's conduct in providing materials and advice to U.S. broker-dealers
would not have a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or on the U.S. securities
exchange) to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale
of, any security (other than an exempted security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) unless such broker or dealer is registered in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section.
98. A broker is defined in § 3(a)(4) of the 1934 Act to include "any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.
... Id. § 78c(a)(4).
99. A dealer is defined in § 3(a)(5) of the 1934 Act as any person who, in the regular course of
business, purchases and sells securities for his own account. Id. § 78c(a)(5).
100. The court in SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1973),
suggested that a mere incidental use of the means and instrumentalities of U.S. interstate commerce, without more, was an insufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction under the antifraud
provisions.
101. See In re F.W. Home & Co., 38 S.E.C. 104, 108 (1957); see also SEC v. Myers, 285 F.
Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1968) (case brought under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §§ 201-221, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1976), in which the court held that solicitation of clients, whether or not
successful, is an integral part of the business of an investment adviser).
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markets. The SEC staff, in two "no-action" letters,' 0 2 has taken the position

that investment advice transmitted from abroad to U.S. public investors constitutes a use of the means and instrumentalities of U.S. interstate com-

merce' 0 3 "to induce" the purchase or sale of a security within the meaning of
section 15(a)(1). Therefore, under the SEC position a foreign broker-dealer

that transmits such investment advice must register under section 15(b), 104
pursuant to the registration requirements of section 15(a)(1). The transmittal

of such advisory materials and advice to U.S. broker-dealers, however, contemplates that the U.S. broker-dealers will use the materials and advice to

solicit brokerage business from their U.S. customers. Because the solicitation
of brokerage business from the public by U.S. broker-dealers is already subject to regulation by U.S. law, 105 the transmittal of advisory materials and
advice by a foreign broker-dealer to U.S. broker-dealers, standing alone,
should not be viewed as having a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or on the
U.S. securities markets. Any effect on protected U.S. interests would arise
only from the U.S. broker-dealers transmitting the materials and advice to

U.S. investors, conduct that is clearly subject to regulation under U.S. law.
Without some clear effect on protected U.S. interests, there seems to be little

reason to subject the internal business operations of a foreign broker-dealer
already regulated by the domiciliary nation to overlapping and possibly con-

fficting regulation under U.S. law.
(ii) Unsolicited Requests for Advice Regarding Foreign Securities
From U.S. Persons
As mentioned above, a foreign broker-dealer may be subject to registration pursuant to section 15(a)(1) if it sends advisory materials regarding specific foreign securities to investors resident in the United States. In a "noaction" letter to Hoare & Govett, Ltd., 106 the SEC staff stated that such advice
to U.S. investors will trigger the registration requirements notwithstanding the
generality of the advice. The staff warned:
102. SEC "No-Action" Letters to Hoare & Co. Govett, Ltd. (avail. Oct. 28, 1973) and to
Wood, Mackenzie & Co. (avail. Sept. 23, 1974). A "no-action" letter is informal, interpretative
legal advice by the SEC staff in which it indicates that, on the basis of certain facts stated in a
letter or other communication, "the staff would not recommend that the Commission take any
enforcement action." 17 C.F.R. § 200.81(a) (1980). The procedure to receive no action and interpretative letters is outlined in 36 Fed. Reg. 2600 (1971). A "no-action" letter does not operate to
bind third parties. See 27 Fed. Reg. 1316, 1317 (1962). The SEC also has argued that a "noaction" letter does not even bar the Commission staff from later instituting an enforcement action
against the recipient of a "no-action" letter. Brief for SEC, Abbett, Sommer & Co. v. SEC, [19701971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,813 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,401 U.S.
974 (1971), citedin 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcurriES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1.11, at 150.3 (1976); Hacker & Rotunda, The SEC's Ectoplasmic Theory of an Issuer as Applied to Educationaland CharitableInstitutions,Bank Trustees,and OtherExempt Issuers, 65 CAL. L. REv. 1181,
1202 n.106 (1977).
103. The term "interstate commerce" is defined in § 3(a)(17) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17)
(1976), to include "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication. . . between any foreign
country and any State .
104. Id. § 78o(b).
105. Id. § 78o(a)(1) & (2).
106. SEC "No-Action Letter" to Hoare & Govett, Ltd. (avail. Oct. 28, 1973).
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The fact that the nature of the advice or solicitation is general-that
is, that Hoare would not recommend specific securities, but might
only mention the name of a foreign broker or dealer and indicate
that foreign securities may be purchased through that foreign firmdoes not appear to suggest a different result. 10 7
The SEC staff letter suggested that the publishing of generalized information in the United States about a foreign broker-dealer and the sending of
advice regarding specific foreign securities to U.S. investors upon their unsolicited request for the information might subject a foreign broker-dealer to the
registration provisions of section 15(a)(1). This suggestion of the staff seems to
rely on a pure conduct test for jurisdiction. By contrast, if the proper jurisdictional test for provisions such as section 15(a)(l)-provisions that impose regulations on internal business operations rather than provisions like section
10(b) relating to the prevention of fraud-requires both conduct within the
United States and a foreseeable effect on U.S. investors or securities markets,
then section 30(b) should exempt from registration under section 15(a)(1) a
foreign broker-dealer who does no more than publish generalized information
about itself in the United States and send advisory information about specific
foreign securities to U.S. persons pursuant to their unsolicited request for the
information. The foreign broker-dealer's conduct does not appear to have a
sufficient effect on protected U.S. interests. A U.S. person who encounters
generalized information about a foreign broker-dealer and who, on his or her
own initiative, requests from the foreign broker-dealer advisory information
about specific foreign securities has no reason to believe that the foreign broker-dealer is engaged in business in the United States and is thereby subject to
regulation under U.S. law. By acting on his or her own initiative to solicit
specific recommendations from a foreign broker-dealer, a U.S. person assumes
the risk that the business affairs of the broker-dealer will be governed by foreign law. There should be no reason, therefore, for the United States to seek
to interfere with a foreign sovereign's regulation of the internal business of its
domiciliary company to protect any legitimate U.S. interests.10 8
(iii) The Maintenance of Clearing Arrangements With
U.S. Broker-Dealers
A foreign broker-dealer should not become subject to jurisdiction under
section 15(a)(1) just because it maintains certain custodian accounts with U.S.
banks in connection with transactions in U.S. securities effected for its foreign
customers through U.S. broker-dealers. These transactions have no significant
impact on U.S. investors because they are effected solely on behalf of the foreign customers. Nor is there a significant impact on U.S. securities markets
from the transactions as they are effected on the U.S. markets solely through
regulated U.S. broker-dealers.
107. Id.
108. See note 86 supra.
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The SEC staff in one "no-action" letter 10 9 appeared to confirm this view,
at least with respect to the foreign customers of the foreign broker-dealer. In
the letter the staff agreed to take "no-action" to require registration of Sun
Hung Kai Securities, Ltd. ("SHK"), a foreign broker-dealer, if SHK used Bear
Steams, a registered U.S. broker-dealer firm, to execute and clear transactions
in U.S. securities for SHK's customers on a fully disclosed basis and if SHK
maintained custodian accounts in U.S. banks in connection with the transactions. The staff emphasized, however, that Bear Steams would not open any
accounts for any SHK customers who were indicated to be U.S. residents or
U.S. citizens abroad. This restriction is reasonable because a foreign brokerdealer's maintenance of accounts of U.S. persons for the purpose of effecting
transactions in U.S. securities on U.S. markets through clearance arrangements with a U.S. broker would appear to have a sufficient effect on protected
U.S. interests to justify regulation under U.S. law.
3. Extraterritorial Application of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act
The tests developed by the courts for the extraterritorial application of the
antifraud provisions of section 10(b) should not apply equally to all of the
other provisions of the 1934 Act. The question of the extraterritorial application of any particular provision of the Act is basically one of congressional
intent." 0 In adopting section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, Congress appears to have
drawn a distinction between isolated events, such as misrepresentations by a
foreign person, to which the U.S. antifraud provisions would apply, and U.S.
regulation of the internal business operations of a foreign business that is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of its host nation.' In the latter case, principles of international comity argue that U.S. law should avoid interfering in a
foreign nation's regulation of the internal affairs of its domiciliary business
organizations, unless there is a clear need to impose U.S. regulation in order to
protect legitimate U.S. interests. 12 Under section 30(b) the courts, when dealing with regulations under the 1934 Act that would apply to the internal business operations of a foreign broker-dealer, have applied a jurisdictional test
that requires both essential conduct within the United States and a foreseeable
effect on U.S. persons or on the U.S. securities markets." 3 Although section
30(b) applies only to broker-dealers and banks,' 14 the jurisdictional test developed under section 30(b) also reflects Congress' intent regarding the extraterritorial application of those provisions under the 1934 Act that would regulate
the internal operations of foreign businesses, as distinct from provisions such
as section 10(b), which would apply to isolated misrepresentations by a foreign
person that had some contact with the United States.
109.
110.
215 (2d
111.
112.

SEC "No-Action Letter" to Bear, Stearns & Co. (avail. Feb. 6, 1976).
See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206, modofied on other grounds, 405 F.2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied. 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
Id. at 207.
See note 86 supra.

113. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 1 5 when applied extraterritorially, imposes
U.S. regulation on the internal affairs of a foreign business. Section 16(b) was
enacted to discourage the unfair use of information in short-term trading by
beneficial owners of more than ten percent of a class of equity security registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act" 6 and by officers and directors of
the issuer of such a security ("statutory insiders"). The section provides that
profits realized by statutory insiders from the purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase, of any equity security of the issuer, within a period of less than six
months, inure to, and are recoverable by, and on behalf of, the issuer. The
section applies automtically to any short-swing transactions, regardless of
whether the insider in fact used inside information when effecting the transactions."17
Section 16(b) imposes automatic liability on the insider regardless of actual injury because the section is designed to assure outside investors who may
wish to trade in the securities that "insiders" of the issuer who may have access
to information regarding the issuer's short-term prospects will not have an advantage when trading in the market. In contrast to the antifraud provisions of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, "18 it is not the purpose of section 16(b) to impose
liability for damages suffered by the plaintiff-issuer or its outside stockholders
resulting from an insider's unfair use of inside information. Nor is it the purpose of section 16(b) to impose liability for any unfair adverse effect on the
market price of an issuer's securities resulting from the insider's short-swing
transactions. Rather, when applied extraterritorially section 16(b) imposes
regulation on the internalaffairs of foreign companies that seek access to the
U.S. securities markets by imposing absolute liability on their officers, directors, and principal stockholders for short-swing profits regardless of fault. "19
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976):

For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by
the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction
or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
116. Id. § 781. See Hacker & Rotunda, Short-Swing Profits, Section 16(b), and Nonstauto.ry
Insiders, 3 CoRP. L. REv. 252 (1980).
117. Cf Hazen, The New Pragmatism under Section 16(b) ofthe Securities Exchange ,Al, 54
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1975) (discussing the pragmatic trend away from an objective application of
§ 16(b)).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
119. See Hetherington, InsiderTrading and the Logic ofIe Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720.
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Section 16(b) applies only to the officers, directors, and principal stockholders of any issuer that registers a class of its equity securities under section
12 of the 1934 Act. When such an issuer is a foreign company subject to regulation by its host nation, however, Congress arguably would not intend to impose regulation pursuant to section 16(b) unless the short-swing transactions
by the insiders of the foreign company would have a foreseeable effect on U.S.
persons or on the U.S. securities markets. This conclusion seems particularly
true because a number of foreign countries have considered, and rejected, im20
posing regulations similar to section 16(b) on their domiciliary companies.'
In Wagman v. Astle 12 1 the lack of any foreseeable effect on protected U.S.
interests led the court, in an action arising under section 16(b), to find it lacked
personal jurisdiction over the insiders of a foreign corporation. Wagman involved an action to recover short-swing profits realized by three Canadians
(officers of a Canadian corporation), who were trading in equity securities of
the corporation on Canadian exchanges and in private sales in Canada. The
Canadian corporation was listed on the American Stock Exchange and registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act. Defendants filed ownership reports with the SEC, as required by section 16(a), which stated defendants'
changes in beneficial ownership of the securities. Defendants, however, did
not do business in the United States, nor did they do any acts in the United
States connected with effecting the transactions giving rise to the cause of action. Hence, jurisdiction over defendants could only be invoked if defendant's
acts in Canada caused effects in the United States sufficient to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable. Because the purpose of section 16(b) was
not to impose liability for actual damage suffered by a private plaintiff as a
result of short-swing transactions nor to protect investors from any adverse
effects of such short-swing transactions on the price of securities trading in the
market, the court concluded that the short-swing transactions effected by the
Canadians in Canada did not have sufficient impact on any protected U.S.
interests to sustain personal jurisdiction over defendants.
While the court in Wagman did not have to reach the question of subject
matter jurisdiction, our analysis suggests that subject matter jurisdiction under
section 16(b) similarly was not meant to extend to the short-swing transactions
involved in Wagman because the transactions had no foreseeable effect on
either specific U.S. persons or on the U.S. securities markets. The short-swing
transactions had no foreseeable effect on any specific U.S. persons because
only the foreign corporation, or its shareholders derivatively, could seek recovery under section 16(b). Even if a U.S. person were a shareholder of the foreign corporation, the purpose of section 16(b) is not to impose liability for any
damage done to that shareholder. Rather, section 16(b) imposes absolute liability on corporate insiders regardless of fault in order to promote investor
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets.
120. Munter, Section 16(b) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934- An Alternative to "Burning
Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69, 70-71 (1966).
121. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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The foreign transactions in Wagman likewise had no foreseeable impact
on the U.S. securities markets. Assuming that securities are traded both
abroad and on a U.S. exchange, one might argue that there is an indirect effect
on U.S. securities markets from short-swing transactions effected abroad because U.S. investors might have less confidence in the U.S. market for a foreign corporation's securities if they feel that an insider of the corporation
could have an advantage over them by trading in the corporation's securities
abroad. In Roth v. Fundof Funds,Ltd.122 such an effect was held sufficient to
sustain jurisdiction under section 16(b) when short-swing transactions were
carried out by foreigners on the U.S. securities markets. 123 When the transactions are carried out by foreigners abroad, however, the cases arising under
section 10(b) suggest that the necessary impact on the U.S. markets must be far
more direct, resulting in a foreseeable "diminution in the value" or price of the
security traded in the U.S. securities market. 124 At best, any arguably adverse
effect on investor confidence in the U.S. markets for a foreign corporation's
securities, resulting from a foreign statutory insider's short-swing transactions
effected abroad, would involve only the type of broad effect on the U.S. economy or U.S. investors in general that Bersch held to be insufficient to support
subject matter jurisdiction over substantially extraterritorial transactions. 12S
B. Jurisdiction Over the Person
1. Service Outside the United States
As Wagman 126 illustrates, apart from subject matter jurisdiction under
the 1934 Act, a federal court must also have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Due process limits a court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a
corporate or individual defendant to those cases in which the defendant has at
least "minimum contacts" 1 27 with the forum state. The minimum contacts test
ensures that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' "128 Factors weighed in determining if the
defendant has the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction include the quantity and quality of any business done in the state by the defendant, whether the contacts the defendant has have been initiated by the
defendant, 2 9 and the foreseeability that an act performed by the defendant
122. 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). See Note,
Jurisdiction--Extra-Territorial,4pplication
of United States Securities Laws, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 150 (1971).
123. 405 F.2d at 422. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
124. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 528 (8th Cir. 1973); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09, modofedon other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
125. See Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 136 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
126. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
127. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
128. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See also World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v.Voodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir,
1980).
129. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (jurisdiction denied because defendant's
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outside the state will have repercussions within the state.' 30 If a court seeks to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant for an act not arising out of
defendant's contacts with the state the defendant's contacts with the forum
permit" the state to
must be "sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as13to
1
force the defendant to litigate the claim in the forum.
Section 27 of the 1934 Act authorizes the court to assert personal jurisdiction to enforce any liability under the Act by service of process "wherever the
defendant may be found." In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.

Maxwell' 32 the Second Circuit held that Congress intended application of section 27 to be limited only by the constraints of due process. 133 Thus, extraterritorial service of process may be had whenever the defendant has the requisite
contacts with the state.134
The court in Wagman 135 suggested that a court is less restrained in exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant than it is in claiming subject matter jurisdiction. 136 The court apparently concluded that Congress had
placed restrictions upon subject matter jurisdiction in addition to those imposed by due process, whereas personal jurisdiction only faces constitutional
limitations. For example, when dealing with U.S. regulation of the internal
affairs of a foreign business Congress probably did not intend to extend subject matter jurisdiction to the limits of due process.
In determining if a foreign defendant possesses the minimum contacts
with the state necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction it is important to
distinguish between jurisdiction over acts arising out of defendant's contacts
with the state, and jurisdiction over defendant for a suit unrelated to defendant's activities within the state. In the first situation personal jurisdiction will
be supported by a single act by defendant within the forum state. For example, if there has been a rule lOb-51 37 violation by a foreign person in the
United States, there will be both subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction
over the defendant for that fraud. A U.S. court is able, then, to assert personal
jurisdiction over the hypothetical foreign broker-dealer, discussed earlier in
this Article, 138 based solely on its conduct within the United States. By contrast Congress, arguably, did not intend U.S. broker-dealer regulations to apply to such conduct by a foreign broker-dealer. Therefore, although a court
contacts with forum state were due to decedent moving to that state after becoming defendant's
customer). See also Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
130. Foreseeability alone is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067 (Supp. 1980).

131. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
132. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
133. Id. at 1340.
134. See also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
135. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
136. Id. at 501-02.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).

138. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
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might assert personal jurisdiction over such a foreign broker-dealer, the court
probably would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the conduct.
If jurisdiction is sought to adjudicate a defendant's liability for an act not
arising out of any contacts defendant has with the forum state, however, the
contacts must be substantial. In determining if defendant's contacts are substantial enough to make it reasonable to extend jurisdiction in this situation
courts appear to consider two factors: the nature and quality of the activities
in the forum state and the dollar volume of business done there.' 39 When
these factors establish that defendant's business within the state forms an "integral part of . .[its] over-all operation," personal jurisdiction will be sus40
tained.1
Finally, personal jurisdiction arises when acts outside the state have an
effect within the state.'14 This basis for jurisdiction will apply when the effect
in the United States involves either an adverse impact on identifiable U.S.
investors, 142 or on the U.S. securities markets.' 43 The Second Circuit, however, has held that this basis for asserting personal jurisdiction must be applied
with caution in an international context, and that at a minimum the effect
within the state must occur "as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory."' 144
Wagman v. Astle 145 is the leading case considering the application of this
basis for jurisdiction in the context of an action to recover section 16(b) shortswing profits for transactions effected by foreign defendants abroad. In Wagman the effect in the United States of such transactions was held to be too
remote to sustain personal jurisdiction.' 46 The Supreme Court's recent decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 14 7 has further clarified the
degree to which conduct occurring outside the forum state must have a direct
impact on the forum in order to sustain personal jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that Oklahoma could
not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York retail automobile dealer merely because it was foreseeable that a New York resident and
purchaser may move to or drive through another state. The court found that
foreseeability alone is not enough. Consistent with due process, the forum
state can only assert personal jurisdiction if the corporation's delivery of its
product to the foreign state "is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises
139. E.g., Walsh v. National Seating Co., 411 F. Supp. 564, 573 (D.,Mass. 1976).
140. Stockwell v. Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 102, 105 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
141. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
142. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 460-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 519
F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).

143. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529 (8th Cir. 1973).
144. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972)
(quoting REST. FOR REL., supra note 7, § 18).
145. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
146. Id. at 499.
147. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See also Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980); Green
v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 87 Ill. App. 3d 279, 408 N.E.2d 1007 (1980). See generally Louis,
The Grasp of Long Arm JurisdictionFinally Exceeds itsReach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savehuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407 (1980).
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from the efforts of the manufaturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product" in the forum state.14 8 The forum state can-

not assert personal jurisdiction unless the corporation delivers its product
"with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
49

State." 1

2. Service Within the United States
Service of process on an individual officer of a foreign company who is
visiting the United States would not constitute valid service on the foreign

corporation unless the individual were the company's designated agent for
service of process in the United States. 150 Assuming that the officer is not the

company's agent for service of process, service on that officer would be sufficient to subject the foreign corporation to suit only if it is "doing business" in
the United States such that a court may assert personal jurisdiction over it.151
In such a case, however, a U.S. court presumably would uphold direct extra-

152
territorial service of process on the foreign corporation.
Even if the foreign officer is a designated agent for service of process, it is

unclear whether a brief visit in the United States would of itself constitute a
sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over either the corpo-

ration or the corporate official. In the past some courts have upheld assertions
of in personam jurisdiction based solely on the transient presence of a defendant within the state. For instance, in Grace v. MacArthur,153 the Federal Dis-

trict Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld an assertion of in
personam jurisdiction based on defendant's presence in the airspace over the

state at the time of service of process.' 5 4 Grace and other similar cases, however, can no longer be considered to be valid precedent for the assertion of

jurisdiction based merely on presence within the state in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.'5 5 The Shaffer Court held that

56
all assertions of jurisdiction must meet the InternationalShoe standard.

The prime factor in determining whether to allow the assertion of jurisdiction
148. 444 U.S. at 297.
149. Id. at 298.
150. Eg., Vogel v. Tenneco Oil Co., 276 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 (D.D.C. 1967).
151. E.g., S.M. Stein Enterprises v. Irish Int'l Airlines, 236 F. Supp. 71, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
152. See text accompanying notes 137-40 supra.
153. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
154. Id. at 448.
155. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For an excellent analysis of Shaffer and its implications, see Hay,
The Interrelationof Jurisdictionand Choice-of-Law in United States Conflicts Law, 28 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 161 (1979).

156. 433 U.S. at 212. The Court spoke in the context of a state court's exercise ofjurisdiction.
The same test, however, should apply to a federal court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over foreigners. The relationship of the United States to noncitizens outside of its territory is
analogous to the relationship of the individual states to nonresidents of the state seeking to assert
jurisdiction. If a state's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a nonresident violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the federal court's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a noncitizen should also violate the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court has long
interpreted the due process restraint of both clauses identically. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19, 383 (1978).
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is not the presence of the defendant within the state, but rather "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."'157 The Court rejected "mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant's activities in
the activity in relation to
the forum" and looked to "the quality and nature 5of
8
the fair and orderly administration of the laws."'
Although Shaffer dealt with an attempted assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction, its requirement that all assertions ofjurisdiction meet the International
Shoe standard makes its rationale applicable to any attempt to assert jurisdiction. In the context of an attempt to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporate official or his corporation solely on the basis of his fortuitous presence within the United States, it would seem that the InternationalShoe standard of "fair play and substantial justice" would seldom be met. The
fortuitous presence of the corporate officer in the United States because of, for
example, an airline stopover at a U.S. airport does not affect the relationship
between the defendant foreign corporation, the forum, and the litigation.
Therefore, service on an agent making a transient appearance in the United
States that is unrelated to the cause of action should not result in personal
jurisdiction over a foreign business entity when, in the absence of the agent's
fortuitous presence, due process strictures would prohibit the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Similarly, although foreigners and foreign corporations frequently own
property in the United States, it does not appear that quasi in rem jurisdiction
should be asserted by a U.S. court to attach such property if the cause of action is unrelated to the property.' 59 Under the Shaffer rationale, whenever it
would appear unlikely that a court could sustain personal jurisdiction over a
foreign officer or his corporation, it would be equally unlikely that a court
60
could seek to attach the corporation's property located in the United States.'
III. CONCLUSION
In seeking to determine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws, a
foreigner finds few guideposts. The SEC has virtually abdicated its rule-making power under the 1934 Act,' 6 ' and Congress has shown no interest in moving into the vacuum.' 62 The small number of cases in this area have focused
157. 433 U.S. at 204.
158. Id.
159. But see Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Louis, supra note

147, at 420 n.97.
160. If process were served on a foreign individual while he was in the United States so as to
validly support personal jurisdiction over him, a U.S. court could then seek to attach that individ-

ual's assets in tle United States in satisfaction of any personal liability imposed upon him.

It should be noted that the Shaffer Court left open the question whether the presence of

defendant's property in a state would be sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is
available to the plaintiff. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976). See Loss, supra note 1, at 307.
162. The proposed FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (A.L.I., Proposed Official Draft, Mar. 15,
1978), however, has a section dealing with the problem. See id. § 1905. See also Loss, supra note
1. Conress has not enacted the proposed Code. As described by Professor Loss, the reporter for

this project, "the draft does not attempt to anticipate more than the more common and repetitive
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on the reach of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. 163 We have
argued that the long arm of U.S. jurisdiction in the antifraud area should not
be used to support by way of analogy a similar reach for those portions of our
securities laws that are aimed at regulating the internal affairs of corporations.
As a matter of policy, Congress should not be deemed to have intended to
extend subject matter jurisdiction in these areas unless not only essential acts
are performed within the United States but also such conduct leads to a substantial and foreseeable or intended impact on protected U.S. interests.1'6
Foreign corporations should not be subjected to our intricate securities
rules, possibly conflicting with the law of the corporation's own domicile, unless important U.S. interests are at stake. A comparison of Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Oil Co. 16 5 with Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.I 66 well illustrates this
factual configurations. It thus allows ample room-particularly in ascertaining 'the limits of international law'-for what Thurman Arnold used to call 'the sporting theory ofjustice.'" Id. at 308.
A study of the proposed § 1905 is beyond the scope of this Article. Compare Karmel,Applicalion 0/the FederalSecurities Code, 7 CONN. L. REv. 669 (1975), with Curtis, The Extraterritorial
Application of the FederalSecurities Code: A FurtherAnalysis, 9 CONN. L. REv. 67 (1976).
163. See generally B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 1, at 426-31.

164. The exercise of self-restraint by U.S. courts in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction will
also enhance the chances that foreign courts will recognize our judgments in those cases in which
we do assert it. For example, such jurisdictional self-restraint may help avoid a situation such as
the one that currently exists in the antitrust area. See generally Rosenthal & Flowe, supra note 8.
The efforts by the United States over the years to extend the extraterritorial reach of its antitrust
laws-see, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963]
Trade Cas. -70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modfed, [1965] Trade Cas. 1 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); compare United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), decree
entered, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), with British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical
Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2 All. E.R. 780 (Ct. App.), [1954] 3 All. E.R. 88 (Ch.)-has lead to countermeasures by other countries. See, e.g., Owles, The Protection of Trading Interests Bill, [19801 4

LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 55 (discussing the British Protection of Trading Interests Bill). This
bill's full title is "A Bill to provide protection from requirements, prohibitions and judgments
imposed or given under the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom and affecting the trading or other interests of persons in the United Kingdom." Id. at 56.
The British bill was in response to the decision of Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd. (In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation), 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), which upheld the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in an antitrust action against various foreign and domestic uranium producers.
Australia and other countries are also considering similar retaliatory action:
Australia is preparing legislation along the line of the UK Protection of Trading
Interests Act.
The Australian government is considering legislation which would enable it to seize
the Australian assets of theTU.S.-based Westinghouse Electric ....
Such an action
would be in retaliation for seizure of assets owned by Australian companies within the
U.S.A., should Westinghouse win its $1,000 million action against 29 U.S. and foreign
uranium producers,.
for allegedly operating a cartel outside the U.S.A. between 1973
and 1975.
The Australian legislative move follows the adoption of measures banning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in antitrust proceedings. These were
enacted in Australia in March 1979 at about the same time that the Protection of Trading
Interests Act was passed by Parliament in the U.K. Similar legislation was proposed by
the Canadian government in July 1979, and is likely to be approved by its parliament
later this year. The law will replace temporary statutory measures adopted to protect
Canadian enterprises against demands for evidence in the Westinghouse uranium case.
New Zealand passed similar measures in July 1979, and the 41 member states of the
British Commonwealth were invited to adopt protective legislation in May, 1979.
Financial Times, European Law Letter 7 (Sept. 1980).

165. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
166. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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latter point.
In Bremen the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a provision in an
international towage contract that provided that any dispute arising out of the
contract would be heard before the London Court of Justice. The contract
also contained two clauses purporting to exculpate the petitioner from liability
for damages to the towed barges. The respondent brought suit in admiralty in
the U.S. courts alleging negligent towage and breach of contract. The lower
courts found the forum selection clause unenforceable, treating it as against
public policy because it was an agreement in advance of a controversy for the
purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. The Supreme Court disagreed, even though it conceded that forum-selection clauses are traditionally
disfavored by U.S. courts. The Court reasoned that the
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and
in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively
on our terms, governed
67
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.'
The Court went on to hold the forum selection clause valid even though the
English courts would likely enforce the exculpatory clauses and the U.S.
courts might find such a clause to be against public policy.
Bremen involved a contract provision negotiated by fully competent and
sophisticated businessmen in an arms length transaction. The effect of this
agreement was that one party gave up the preexisting right to turn to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and accepted the exculpatory clauses. Any public policy
against forum-selection or exculpatory clauses is primarily for the benefit of
the parties, who in turn ought to be able to waive this protection in circumstances such as those in Bremen. It is, however, a different matter if parties
can contract out of a regulatory law, like rule lOb-5, because the purpose of
that rule is to protect investors in general, not merely the parties. Yet in
Scherk the Court allowed this more far-reaching escape of the reach of U.S.
law. In Scherk, the Court enforced an arbitration clause in an international
sales contract between a U.S. corporation and a German citizen. The agreement provided that arbitration would be before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris and that Illinois law should govern. The district court,
nonetheless, sought to exercise jurisdiction claiming that Scherk's fraudulent
representations concerning certain trademark rights violated section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. The lower court relied on section 14 of the 1933 Act, which prohibits "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter .... ,,168
Relying on section 14, the Supreme Court had previously declined to en167. 407 U.S. at 9.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
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force such arbitration clauses, finding them against public policy. 169 The
Court in Scherk, nevertheless distinguished these earlier cases because the
170
sales contract involved in Scherk "was a truly international agreement."'
Unlike a case in which it is clear that U.S. law applies, the international character of the contract created uncertainty over the applicable law. It was because of this uncertainty that the parties bargained for and stipulated to the
applicability of Illinois law, with any controversies or claims arising out of the
agreement to be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce inParis. Given the importance of international commerce and
trade, the U.S. courts should respect such arbitration clauses:
[U]ncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any
contract touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the
law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition
to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision
obviates any danger that a dispute under the agreement might be
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these
jockpurposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive
17 1
eying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages.
If, in some circumstances, the importance of foreign trade is sufficient to
counteract the policies behind section 14 of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, then, a fortiori, foreign corporations should not be subjected to
intricate U.S. securities rules regulating the internal affairs of corporations unless important U.S. interests are at stake. The difficulty of securing valid personal jurisdiction in such circumstances underscores this conclusion, for it is
unlikely that Congress would have engaged in a fruitless exercise of attempting to assert subject matter jurisdiction in cases in172which it is very likely that
no valid personal jurisdiction could be obtained.
169. E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Because of the provisions of § 14 of the 1933
Act, the Wilko Court refused to recognize the applicability of the United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which had placed arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts.
The Scherk Court, however, found the Arbitration Act applicable, distinguishing Wilko because
the international contract in Scher.k was not constrained by § 14. 417 U.S. at 514-20. See text
accompanying note 171 infra.
170. 417 U.S. at 515.
171. Id. at 516-17.
172. The difficulty of securing proper venue in 1934 Act cases in many situations outside of
the antifraud provisions also supports this conclusion.
Under § 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), venue may be laid in any district where
the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, transacts business, or where any act or transaction constituting the violation or the liability-creating action occurred. The Second Circuit has held, for
example, that venue in an action under § 16(b) is proper in the district where the securities exchange is located, although the order to buy or sell may have been given elsewhere, if the purchase
and the sale giving rise to liability were executed on the exchange. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d
46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). Moreover, venue is present for the entire § 16(b)
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claim if any of the transactions giving rise to liability occurred within the district even though not
all of them did. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954). Thus, if any short-swing transactions were executed in the United States, venue would lie
for the entire § 16(b) claim in any district where the transactions were executed. On the other
hand, if none of the transactions were executed in the United States or otherwise involved any
contact with the United States, venue would be appropriately set only where the defendant is
found or transacts business. If the foreign corporation maintains no employees or agents in the
United States, it would not be found in the United States even though it may have property there.
United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp., 237 F. Supp. 971, 976 (D. Del. 1964). An individual traveling in the United States might, of course, be "found" for both venue and service of process purposes.
To determine where a corporation "transacts business," it has been held that "[t]he quantum
of business which must be transacted in a district to permit the laying of venue therein is less than
the 'doing business' necessary to warrant a finding that the defendant is present or is to be found,
in the district for jurisdictional purposes." SEC v. Wimer, 75 F. Supp. 955, 962 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
Nevertheless, the activities within the district must constitute "a substantial part of a defendant's
ordinary business [and] be continuous, and at least of some duration," and the burden is on the
plaintiff to support venue. United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp., 237 F. Supp. 971, 978-79 (D.
DeL 1964).

